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ABSTRACT
This article investigates the initial conflict between the Parthians and Seleucids in the late 230s BC that es-
tablished a much longer period of rivalry between these opposing forces. Arsaces I founded the independent 
Parthian kingdom in northeastern Iran during a period of geopolitical crisis throughout the Hellenistic Middle 
East. Although he successfully removed and replaced the rebellious Seleucid satrap in the region and quickly 
integrated his followers into the local aristocracy, the Parthian state remained vulnerable. The Parthians could 
expect some form of imminent Seleucid retaliation if the war between Seleucus II and his brother Antiochus 
Hierax subsided. This article reconsiders the eastern campaign of Seleucus against the Parthians to appreciate 
better the agency and accomplishments of the Parthians. It challenges the tradition that the Parthians were 
weak and acted cowardly. Instead, it concludes that the Parthians proved resourceful, clever, and triumphant.
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In the 240s–230s BC Seleucid hegemony over the Iranian plateau collapsed during a period of 
crisis fueled by damaging external conflicts and internal turmoil (Overtoom 2016a; Over-
toom 2020, 65–93).1 It was at this time that Seleucid governors in Parthia and Bactria broke 
away from the Seleucid state to form rival regimes. Moreover, the hereto insignificant Parni 
tribe living along the Central Asian frontier, under the leadership of the capable and char-
ismatic Arsaces I, used this crisis to establish itself in northeastern Iran, swiftly occupying 
a region known as Parthia and integrating into the local communities.2 With this occupation 
the independent kingdom of Parthia emerged, establishing the Arsacid dynasty as a new 
force within the geopolitics of the Hellenistic Middle East and sparking rivalry between the 
Parthians and Seleucids.
The focus of this article is an investigation of the initial conflict between the Parthians and 
Seleucids in the late 230s that established a much longer period of rivalry. With the success of 
Arsaces I in founding the independent Parthian kingdom in northeastern Iran, the Parthians 
could expect some form of imminent Seleucid retaliation. The disintegration of the Seleu- 
cids’ eastern frontier during the crisis made a Seleucid campaign to reconquer the region and 
punish the Parthians and Bactrians increasingly necessary.
By the latter half of the 230s, the Seleucid king, Seleucus II, could no longer afford to ignore 
the growing power of the Parthians and Bactrians in the east. Justin records that Seleucus 
‘came to take vengeance on the rebels (ad defectors persequendos veniente)’ (Justin, XXXXI, 4.9). 
Seleucus mounted the first royal campaign into the east since his great-grandfather but with 
much different results.
1 All dates in this study are BC unless otherwise indicated.
2 Arsaces successfully gained the support of the indigenous population. Frye 1984, 208; Shahbazi 
1986; Olbrycht 2003, 73–75.
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It appears that the initial stages of the eastern campaign went well for Seleucus II. He 
pacified Babylonia, strengthened Media, and reclaimed much of Parthia, temporarily forcing 
Arsaces I to withdraw toward the Central Asian steppe. Strabo states, ‘Later Arsaces, when he 
fled (φεύγων) from Seleucus Callinicus, withdrew into the country of the Apasiacae’ (Strabo, 
XI, 8.8).3 Yet there is no record of a military victory over the Parthians by Seleucus, nor is there 
sufficient evidence to assume that Seleucus restored Seleucid dominion over northeastern Iran 
by establishing Parthia as a vassal principality.4 Moreover, the Roman tradition is clear that 
Arsaces later defeated Seleucus (Justin, XXXXI, 4.9–10; Ammianus, XXIII, 6.3; Malalas, VIII, 198).
Arsaces I’s resources were quite limited.5 If Seleucus II had defeated the Parthians decisively, 
this would have devastated Arsaces’ position. It would have been almost impossible for him 
to then raise another army strong enough to defeat Seleucus later in the campaign. If there 
was a military engagement in the early stages of the invasion, it must have been minor and 
inconclusive.
Thus, Strabo’s brief account is peculiar and requires further consideration. Arsaces I had 
been readying for a Seleucid invasion for years by the time Seleucus II entered Parthia, lev-
ying soldiers, expanding his territory, and forging an alliance with the new king of Bactria, 
Diodotus II (Justin, XXXXI, 4.8–9). It perhaps seems odd then that Arsaces would ‘flee’ Parthia 
without a major engagement. Strabo’s passage directly connects the flight of Arsaces from 
Seleucus to the flight of the Persian general, Spitamenes, from Alexander the Great (Strabo, XI, 
8.8; Arrian, Anab., III, 28.16, 29.12, 30.1). In Strabo’s account both eastern commanders appear 
cowardly, desperate, and inferior compared to their Macedonian counterparts. Yet Strabo 
here follows a well-established Graeco-Roman literary tradition of portraying easterners as 
inferior, and therefore these stereotyped characteristics of easterners in this passage likely 
are a superficial exaggeration of the actual motives of Arsaces.6
Instead of viewing Arsaces I as a weak easterner, fleeing in the face of the superior Mac-
edonian general, Seleucus II, it is preferable to consider the actions of Arsaces in a more 
constructive light. If we view Seleucus’ eastern campaign within the larger contexts of a long 
series of asymmetrical defensive wars waged by the Parthians against more traditionally 
armed Macedonian and Roman invaders over the next two centuries, then we get a sense 
that Arsaces’ withdrawal in the face of Seleucus’ advance was in fact a planned Parthian 
strategy, rather than a cowardly escape.7 Strabo here inadvertently appears to record the first 
3 For background on the Apasiacae and the relationship of Parthia with other Central Asian tribes, 
see Lerner 1999, 34, note 6. For Strabo and the Parthians, see Drijvers 1998.
4 Many scholars argue the Parthians remained at least loosely integrated within Seleucid hegemony 
during their early history; however, the defeat and/or submission of the Parthians in this period 
is an exaggeration. Wiesehöfer 1986; Sherwin-White – Kuhrt 1993; Wiesehöfer 1994a; 1994b; 
Brosius 2006; Engels 2011; Strootman 2011–2012; Engels 2014a; 2014b; Sampson 2015, 42; St-
rootman 2015; Wenghofer – Houle 2016; Strootman 2017; 2018; Wenghofer 2018; Erickson 
ed. 2018; Kosmin 2018; Overtoom 2020.
5 Even after forging an empire, the Parthian field army remained relatively small (between 20.000–
30.000 men). Potter 2010, 157; Olbrycht 2016, 295; McLaughlin 2016, 223–224. Arsaces would 
have commanded only a fraction of these later resources.
6 The Greeks and Romans viewed the Parthians as a mixture between the Scythians and Persians. Thus, 
for the Romans, the Parthians were fiercer than the Persians, but they too suffered from eastern 
despotism and duplicity. (Isaac 2006, chs. 4–5, 8; Lerouge-Cohen 2007; Lerouge-Cohen 2009; 
Gregoratti 2015, 203–204; Overtoom 2016b; Müller 2017; Engels 2017; Overtoom 2017a; 2017b).
7 Reimagining Parthian militarism is a subject upon which I have written extensively (Overtoom 
2016a; 2016b; 2016c; 2017a; 2017b; 2019a; 2019b; 2019c; 2020; forthcoming a; forthcoming b; forth-
coming c; forthcoming d).
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surviving reference to a unique mode of warfare developed by the Parthians, what I have 
called their ‘Feign Retreat, Defeat in Detail’ mode of warfare (Overtoom 2017b; Overtoom 
2020, 27–64). The Parthians’ unique mode of warfare gave them an important advantage in 
their longstanding rivalry with the Seleucids, and I would argue played a major factor in the 
failure of Seleucus’ invasion.
Within this longstanding military tradition, the Parthians applied their tactical approach-
es to battle to their larger strategic objectives. Mobility, flexibility, deception, intimidation, 
and concentration of force were at the core of their campaign strategies. The Parthians had 
three fundamental strategic approaches, what I call the ‘Overwhelm Strategy’, the ‘Harass 
Strategy’, and the ‘Deceptive Withdrawal Strategy’ (Overtoom 2020, 49). Similar to their 
tactical approaches to war, these strategies were flexible and interchangeable over the course 
of a campaign, and since the Parthians rarely possessed a numerical advantage in a conflict, 
they tended to favor the latter two strategies.
In campaigns where an enemy became vulnerable through miscalculation, coercion, or 
deception, the Parthians utilized their Overwhelm Strategy to engage the enemy aggressively 
with overwhelming force and defeat that enemy in detail (Overtoom 2020, 49–50, 103, 124–125, 
183, 204, 209–210, 236, 244–245, 266, 270). For example, the Parthians implemented their Over-
whelm Strategy to attack Crassus at Carrhae and later to destroy Marc Antony’s baggage train 
during his invasion of Media. In 36 the Parthians surrounded and annihilated around 10.000 
Roman soldiers along with Antony’s legate, Oppius Statianus, and the crucially important 
Roman siege engines (Paterculus, II, 82; Plutarch, Ant. 38.2–3; Dio, XXXIX, 25–26; Florus, II, 
20.3; Livy, Perioch. 130). Yet the Parthians also utilized the Overwhelm Strategy to defeat the 
Seleucids several times (Justin, XXXVI, 1.5, XXXVIII, 9.2, 10.7–10, XLI, 4.9–10; Justin, Prol. 35–36; 
Diodorus, XXXIII–XXXV; Josephus, Ant. XIII, 186, 218–219, 253; I Maccabees, 14.2–3; V Maccabees, 
21.23–24; Appian, Syr. 11.67-8; Ammianus, XXIII, 6.3; Malalas, VIII, 198; Athenaeus, 5.38; Posi-
donius, 16 = FGrH, III.258). The mobility, flexibility, and sustainability of the Parthian army on 
campaign generally was an effective, often devastating approach to warfare that frustrated 
many of the Parthians’ numerous enemies.
If the Parthians faced an enemy that could not be overcome with brute force, they preferred 
to act aggressively with an asymmetric style of strategic warfare that distressed, hounded, and 
confused that enemy over great distances. The Parthians’ Harass Strategy attempted to force 
an enemy through coercion into making mistakes during its advance or retreat that might 
create an opportunity for the Parthians to exploit (Overtoom 2020, 50–51, 121, 124–25, 182, 
183, 202–203). It utilized mobility, coordination, and psychological warfare to demoralize and 
weaken an enemy. For example, the Parthians implemented their Harass Strategy especially 
during the retreats of Crassus and Antony. The Parthians outmaneuvered, isolated, and envel-
oped Roman detachments numerous times during Antony’s advance and retreat from Media 
as they aggressively pursued the Roman army (Plutarch, Ant. 39.2–50.1; Florus, II, 20.4–10). Yet 
the Parthians also utilized the Harass Strategy to manipulate multiple Seleucid armies (Poly- 
bius, X, 29.3–31.3; Justin, XXXVI, 1.4, XXXVIII, 9.2).
If the more aggressive Harass Strategy did not work or was not applicable, the Parthians 
could turn to their Deceptive Withdrawal Strategy (Overtoom 2020, 50–51, 99, 103, 114, 117–118, 
203). Because of their superior mobility, the Parthians deceptively could withdrawal deep 
into their territory in the hope that they could encourage overconfidence or complacency in 
an enemy. For example, the Parthians implemented the Deceptive Withdrawal Strategy to 
persuade Crassus to advance toward Carrhae and to encourage Antony to leave his baggage 
train in a vulnerable position. Yet the Parthians also utilized the Deceptive Withdrawal Strat-
egy to outmaneuver and deceive the Seleucids several times (Strabo, XI, 8.8; Justin, XXXVIII, 
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10.6–10, XLI, 4.9–10; Polybius, X, 28.5–7, 31.3–5; Josephus, Ant. XIII, 251). Once the enemy had 
relaxed its guard or made a dangerous blunder, the Parthians could counterattack with their 
Overwhelm or Harass strategies.
Some might wonder if the strategic deceptive withdrawals of the Parthians in these vari-
ous campaigns simply could be real retreats. A military retreat is not necessarily a surrender 
or a defeat; it can be part of a policy of strategic withdrawal, the main intent of which is to 
preserve one’s forces and to reengage later under circumstances that are more favorable. How-
ever, first, the Parthian style of retreat was unique compared to more conventionally armed 
Persian, Hellenistic, or Roman examples because of its more mobile and flexible nomadic 
elements. Ancient armies traditionally sought out climactic, decisive battles with face-to-face 
strength of arms as the determining factor. Yet the Parthians rarely did this because their 
style of warfare was nontraditional, and they never developed the heavy infantry necessary 
to match Hellenistic or Roman armies on more traditional terms. This major difference in 
military philosophy helps explain the confusion and frustration of the Seleucids and Ro-
mans in their numerous unsuccessful conflicts with the Parthians. The strategic deceptive 
withdrawals of the Parthians, because of their vastly superior mobility and different military 
philosophy, were indeed unique compared to the more standard understanding of retreats 
by other contemporary militaries in the Graeco-Roman world.
Second, it is clear from the sources that the Parthians wanted their enemies to assume that 
they were not only retreating but also fleeing. The Parthians went through great difficulties 
to implement a system of organized chaos during their strategic withdrawals. They wanted 
to create the impression of disorder and weakness, while maintaining strict discipline and 
awareness, to capitalize on opportunities. Thus, the Parthians feigned weakness to accomplish 
similar objectives, namely the defeat of an overconfident and vulnerable enemy in detail. 
When the Parthians ‘fled’ an important territory in the face of a major invasion; they were not 
really abandoning it. They ultimately wanted to lure their enemies into making poor military 
decisions so that the Parthians could isolate, harass, and overwhelm them.
Finally, there is enough evidence to suggest that the Parthians’ strategic approach to 
warfare, including their policy of strategic deceptive withdrawals, was fairly uniform over 
the course of two centuries (Overtoom 2020). The Parthians could apply their asymmetric 
mode of warfare in a well-developed strategy over many months and over hundreds of miles. 
The Parthians’ unique approach to implementing a retreat in the form of strategic deceptive 
withdrawals complimented their military advantages. It also helps explain their ability to 
withstand major efforts on several occasions by the Seleucids and Romans to subdue them.
After agreeing to a truce with his brother, Antiochus Hierax, in 236, Seleucus II came to 
the east to take vengeance on the Parthians and Bactrians. Although Arsaces I of Parthia and 
Diodotus II of Bactria had formed a military alliance against this impending threat, Parthia 
was the most immediate and vulnerable target of the Seleucids (Holt 1999, 62–64; Overtoom 
2020, 95–99). When Seleucus invaded Parthia sometime in the latter half of the 230s, the Par-
thians were not able to overwhelm him in a conventional battle.
Strabo records that Arsaces fled in the face of Seleucus’ invasion to his allies on the Central 
Asian steppe. However, Strabo’s biased portrayal of weak easterners in direct comparison 
to Alexander the Great and Seleucus disregards any strategic objectives on the part of the 
Parthians (Strabo, XI, 8.8). Again, there is no evidence for a major engagement early in this 
conflict, and therefore, we should consider why Arsaces chose to ‘flee’.
If we consider the eastern campaign of Seleucus II within the context of the Parthians’ 
unique asymmetric mode of warfare, Arsaces I’s withdrawal into the Central Asian steppe 
does not appear to be a cowardly or disorganized rout; rather, it appears to be a calculated, 
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strategic maneuver (Overtoom 2020, 99–107). Despite Arsaces’ recent efforts to solidify his 
regional strength and expand his army, he quickly recognized that his force was no match 
for the royal Seleucid army in a conventional battle, and therefore, he did not risk a major 
engagement at this time. Arsaces decided to conserve his strength and attempted to deceive 
Seleucus into thinking the Parthians were weak.
Within their unique mode of warfare, Arsaces I implemented the first possible example we 
have of the Parthians’ Deceptive Withdrawal Strategy. Because of his army’s superior mobility, 
Arsaces could afford to withdraw deep into his territory in the hope that he could encourage 
overconfidence or complacency in Seleucus II. Thus, the Parthian strategy, at least initially, 
was to buy time and encourage Seleucus into making a mistake.
The Parthian army had the mobility and the flexibility to avoid enemy forces, which allowed 
them to maintain the initiative during campaigns even though they were in retreat. With ex-
perience from years of interactions along the Seleucid eastern frontier and after watching the 
recent crisis in the Hellenistic Middle East unfold, Arsaces I understood that in the latter half 
of the 230s Seleucus II could not maintain a static campaign in the far-off eastern lands of the 
Iranian plateau for an extended period. Tensions with Seleucus’ brother, Antiochus Hierax, 
who ruled from Anatolia, remained considerable and a renewal of the civil war was looming. 
In fact, Justin states that after Seleucus suffered a defeat at the hands of the Parthians he was 
‘recalled into Asia [Minor] by new disturbances’ (Justin, XLI, 4.9–5.1). Meanwhile, Arsaces was 
not Seleucus’ only target. Seleucus also wanted to punish the Bactrians while he was in the east. 
With a clear understanding of the many obstacles that Seleucus faced, Arsaces could afford 
to be cautious and bide his time. Seleucus could not force a major engagement with the more 
mobile Parthians, but he also could not remain in Parthia permanently. Whether the Seleucids 
returned to Syria or invaded Bactria, the position of Arsaces remained strong on the southern 
edge of the Central Asian steppe if he could retain control over his army. Arsaces could wait 
for the Seleucids to leave southern Parthia, and he was in a great position to take advantage 
of any military opportunities in the meantime. If we accept that the militarily experienced 
and capable Arsaces did not simply flee in panic in the face of Seleucus’ advance, then his 
attempt to lull the Seleucids into a state of dangerous complacency and his calculations about 
the pressures facing Seleucus were correct. Arsaces would demonstrate the effectiveness of 
the Parthians’ mode of warfare.
Unfortunately, only a brief outline of the campaign has survived; however, two events are 
certain. After the initial withdrawal of the Parthians, they soon after defeated the Seleucids 
decisively in battle. Justin records, ‘Engaging with king Seleucus [II], who came to take venge-
ance on the rebels [in Parthia and Bactria], he [Arsaces] obtained a victory; and the Parthians 
observe the day on which it was gained with great solemnity, as the date of the commencement 
of their liberty’ (Justin, XLI, 4.9–10). Moreover, although Ammianus Marcellinus confuses 
Seleucus II with his great-grandfather Seleucus I, he similarly records, ‘After many glorious 
and valiant deeds, and after he [Arsaces] had conquered Seleucus [I] Nicator [in reality, Se-
leucus II], successor of the said Alexander, on whom his many victories had conferred that 
surname, and [after Arsaces] had driven out the Macedonian [that is, the Seleucid] garrisons 
[from Parthia], he passed his life in quiet peace, and was a mild ruler and judge of his subjects’ 
(Ammianus, XXIII, 6.3).8 Justin and Ammianus are clear that the defeat of Seleucus II’s eastern 
campaign was swift and unexpected.
8 John Malalas offers a similar account and makes the same mistake as Ammianus. See Malalas, VIII, 
198. For the Parthians in John Malalas, see Hackl – Jacobs – Weber eds. 2010, 285–292.
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It is also possible that the Parthians even captured Seleucus II in the aftermath of their 
victory. The principal evidence supporting the conclusion that the victorious Arsaces I also 
captured Seleucus is a brief account in Athenaeus, who states, ‘And in his [Posidonius’] elev-
enth book [but perhaps his sixteenth book], speaking of Seleucus [II] the king, and relating 
how he came against Media, and warred against Arsaces, but was taken prisoner by the 
barbarian, and how he remained a long time in captivity to Arsaces, being treated like a king 
by him’ (Athenaeus, 5.38).9 Some scholars discount this passage by arguing that Athenaeus 
and Posidonius here mistake Seleucus II either for Demetrius II, whom the Parthians later 
captured, or simply for a Seleucus, who they claim was a little known son of the later king, 
Antiochus VII.10 There is a further speculative argument that Seleucus II launched two eastern 
expeditions, one that succeeded in driving off Arsaces I and another that resulted in defeat at 
the hands of Arsaces (Schippman 1980, 22; Wolski 1996, 182–183; Lerner 1999, 36–37).11 Yet 
it is highly unlikely that Seleucus II had the time or resources to conduct two major eastern 
expeditions; rather, the sources simply emphasize two phases of Seleucus’ eastern campaign. 
In the first phase, the Seleucids encountered initial success, or at least what appeared to be 
success since the Parthians looked to have fled. Then in the second phase, Seleucus suffered 
a considerable defeat against the Parthians, after which he returned to the west.12
What remains to be considered is the fate of Seleucus II during his eastern campaign.13 
Athenaeus and Posidonius state that he became a prisoner, and Seleucus’ adopted personal 
image and coinage perhaps also supports the conclusion that the Parthians held him in cap-
tivity, at least briefly.14 Seleucus adopted the epithet Pogon (‘Bearded’), and he and Demetrius 
II, whom the Parthians later captured, produced coinage portraying themselves with a full 
beard (an image that became standard in Parthian coinage).15 Seleucus II also adopted the 
epithet Callinicus (‘Gloriously Triumphant’); however, this appellation celebrated his victory 
over his brother, not the Parthians (Lerner 1999, 37; Coşkun 2018: 221–222; Olbrycht forth-
coming). It is perhaps most likely that Seleucus and later Demetrius adopted their bearded 
identities to reflect the length and emphasize the religious importance of their eastern cam-
paigns (Lorber – Iossif 2009, 105, 111–112). Yet it is highly unlikely that their bearded images 
marked major victories over the Parthians, which they did not gain, or symbolized an attempt 
to associate themselves directly with senior Greek gods, such as Zeus (Lorber – Iossif 2009, 
87, 105, 107–111).16 After returning to the west, their beards likely served as a reminder of their 
9 Posidonius, 16 (= FGrH, III.258).
10 For Demetrius’ capture, which admittedly bears several similarities, see Justin, XXXVI, 1.5, XXXVIII, 
9.2; Justin, Prol. 35–6; Appian, Syr. XI, 67; Josephus, Ant. XIII, 186, 218–9; I Maccabees 14.2–3; Diodorus, 
XXXIII, 28.1; Eusebius, Chron., 255; Sebeos in Thomson ed. 1978, 364–365. Note Kidd 1988, 303.
11 Assar suggests an even more unlikely scenario that Seleucus originally fought Arsaces unsuccess-
fully in 247 before conducting an inconclusive invasion of Parthia again in 229 (Assar 2011, 114).
12 Strootman suggests Seleucus successfully vassalized Parthia (Strootman 2011; 2015; 2018). How-
ever, there is no evidence that Arsaces served as Seleucus’ vassal, and the sources are clear that 
Seleucus’ eastern campaign was a failure (Justin, XL, 4.9–10, 5.1; Ammianus, XXIII, 6.3; Malalas, VIII, 
198; Athenaeus, 5.38; Posidonius, 16 = FGrH, III.258).
13 For those who argue that Seleucus was a Parthian captive, see Froelich 1744, 30–31, 66; Clinton 1881, 
311–313; Cunningham 1884, 113–114; Eckhel 1888, 218; Head 1911, 639; Lerner 1999, 35; Olbrycht 
2019. For those who attempt to reject this argument, see Visconti 1808, 298–299; Babelon 1890, 
lxv; Newell 1938, 64, 135, 200–203; Will 1967, i 311–313; Kidd 1988, 304; Strootman 2011; 2015; 2018.
14 For Seleucus’ bearded coinage, see Newell 1938, 64, 135, 200–203; Lorber – Iossif 2009, 95–96.
15 For the use of beards in Seleucid coinage, see Messina 2003; Lorber – Iossif 2009. For Seleucus 
adopting the epithet Pogon, see Polybius, II, 71. 4.
16 Compare Günther 2011; Wright 2013.
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unfinished business in the east against the Parthians, and therefore, ‘the beard would have 
been a damaging symbol of failure— yet the alternative of impiety was perhaps even more 
unacceptable’ (Lorber – Iossif 2009, 105). Apart from Athenaeus’ account of Posidonius, the 
evidence admittedly is circumstantial; however, the capture of Seleucus by the Parthians 
remains possible and should not be rejected out of hand.
Although Seleucus II may or may not have become a captive of Arsaces I, the Parthians 
under Arsaces’ guidance unequivocally gained a significant military victory over the Seleu-
cids, and Seleucus fell victim to the Parthians’ unique mode of warfare. The sudden reversal 
of Seleucus’ fortune and the swiftness of his defeat makes it likely that he made a military 
or logistical error that left his army vulnerable to a Parthian counterattack. With a unified 
force, the Seleucids had been too strong for the Parthians to confront in battle, and therefore, 
Seleucus’ defeat appears to have been a consequence of dividing his army and his attention.
Ammianus and Photius state that Arsaces I had to remove Seleucid garrisons from Parthia 
after his defeat of Seleucus II (Ammianus, XXIII, 6.3; Photius, Bib. 58). Therefore, after the Par-
thians under Arsaces ‘fled’ and appeared not to be a threat, Seleucus apparently attempted to 
reoccupy southern Parthia by dividing a portion of his army into garrisons.17 Once Seleucus 
had divided his main force, Arsaces saw his opportunity and successfully counterattacked 
against what remained of Seleucus’ divided field army.18 It is quite plausible that, misun-
derstanding the purpose of the Parthians’ unique mode of warfare, Seleucus viewed Arsaces’ 
withdrawal to the north as a sign of weakness. By not pursuing Arsaces and by dividing his 
army to reoccupy Parthia, Seleucus demonstrated that he did not consider the Parthians a se-
rious threat. Further, this complacency could have encouraged Seleucus to turn his attention 
toward Bactria, which at the time was considered the stronger regional rival. Yet a march 
toward Bactria would have exposed the flanks of Seleucus’ divided army to Arsaces’ decisive 
counterattack. In fact, some scholars argue that Arsaces’ new ally, Diodotus II, sent troops 
from Bactria to aid the Parthians (Wolski 1996, 182–183; Lerner 1999, 36). If Bactrian troops 
played any role in the climactic battle between Arsaces and Seleucus, then the conflict likely 
occurred closer to Bactria in eastern Parthia.
Seleucus II never reached Bactria, and therefore, his eastern campaign ended in disaster 
at the hands of the Parthians somewhere in between his invasions of Parthia and Bactria. It 
appears that the Parthians’ Deceptive Withdrawal Strategy accomplished two key objectives. 
First, it inspired complacency in Seleucus, who began reoccupying Parthia instead of pursuing 
the Parthians, and second, it encouraged overconfidence in Seleucus, who decided to divide 
his army and turn his attention toward the Bactrians without first defeating the Parthians.
By dividing his army, ignoring the threat of the Parthians, and increasingly isolating 
himself between Arsaces I and Diodotus II as he continued east, Seleucus II created a major 
opportunity for his enemies. Arsaces shifted from the Parthians’ Deceptive Withdrawal 
Strategy to their Overwhelm Strategy, which he utilized to engage Seleucus aggressively with 
overwhelming force and defeat him in detail. The vulnerability of the Seleucid army made 
the sweeping victory of Arsaces possible. Thus, our first recorded instance of the Parthians 
implementing their ‘Feign Retreat, Defeat in Detail’ mode of warfare demonstrates its early 
17 These garrisons might have been necessary winter quarters. Antiochus VII later had to divide his 
army into garrisons during his campaign against the Parthians as well (Justin, XXXVIII, 10.8; Di-
odorus, XXXIV/XXXV, 17.2). Contrary to Strootman’s conclusion that Seleucus transitioned Seleucid 
imperialism in the east toward a vassalage model (Strootman 2011; 2015; 2018), it appears Seleucus 
maintained the traditional model of direct imperialism.
18 Antiochus VII suffered a similar defeat (Justin, XXXVIII, 10.8–10; Diodorus, XXXIV/XXXV, 15–17; 
Appian, Syr. XI, 68).
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association with the Arsacids and its effectiveness. Arsaces executed the Parthians’ asym-
metric approach to warfare to perfection because Seleucus played directly into its strengths.
Seleucus II’s defeat and possible capture in the latter half of the 230s had enormous ge-
opolitical ramifications.19 The reputation of the already reeling Seleucid state was damaged 
considerably and the prestige of the Seleucid king significantly diminished. This military 
defeat against the Parthians, paired with the possible shameful capture of the Seleucid king, 
severely threatened the stability of the Seleucid state in the west and further weakened Se-
leucid authority. This encouraged other regions like Persis, Elymais, and Media Atropatene 
to challenge Seleucid hegemony and helped cause another cycle of civil wars (Grainger 2015, 
20, 56; Grainger 2016, 52; Coşkun 2018; Olbrycht forthcoming).20
Seleucus II’s failures in the east also suddenly left Mesopotamia and Syria vulnerable. Pow-
er relations within the lands of the Near East established by the 236 truce between Seleucus 
and Antiochus Hierax no longer reflected the realities of power distribution in that region. 
The defeat of Seleucus drastically and suddenly reduced the power of the Seleucid Empire and 
Seleucus’ authority. This helps explain why Antiochus renewed the civil war against Seleucus 
in 229/228 with the invasion of Syria and Mesopotamia (Justin, XL, 5.1).21 The sudden weak-
ness of Seleucus and his regime because of his failed eastern campaign encouraged further 
pressure from competitors.
Meanwhile, in the east the failure of Seleucus II to subdue Parthia and Bactria reinforced 
the tripolar balance of power between the Seleucids, Parthians, and Bactrians (Overtoom 
2016a, 985, 987–988, 992, 998–999; Overtoom 2020, 77, 104). It also helped further solidify 
Parthian power regionally and expanded Arsaces I’s regional influence.22 Finally, it allowed 
Arsaces to establish a solid economic and military foundation in Parthia that his successors 
continued to develop over the next century (Olbrycht 1998, 51–76; Olbrycht 2003, 74–75; Ol-
brycht 2010, 229; Shayegan 2011; Overtoom 2019a; 2019b; 2020; Overtoom forthcoming a).
The defeat and possible capture of Seleucus II appears also to have led to the establishment 
of formal and recognized independence for Parthia and Bactria (Lerner 1999, 36–37).23 Justin 
records, ‘The Parthians observe the day on which it [victory over Seleucus II] was gained with 
great solemnity, as the date of the commencement of their liberty (libertatis)’ (Justin, XLI, 
4.10). By defeating Seleucus and repulsing his eastern campaign, the Parthians and Bactrians 
had reassured their sovereignty in direct opposition to the Seleucid state. Yet Arsaces I and 
Diodotus II still would have desired formal recognition of their independence by Seleucus 
to enhance their legitimacy and international standing. They did not want to remain ‘rebels’ 
within the Hellenistic Middle East, and the defeat of Seleucus gave them the opportunity they 
needed to demand formal recognition of their independence.
There were practical reasons for Seleucus II to recognize the sovereignty of Parthia and 
Bactria as well. It appears Seleucus conducted his eastern campaign in the latter half of the 
230s, perhaps entering Babylonia as early as 235/234 to prepare the campaign (Sachs – Hun-
19 Lerouge-Cohen unfairly belittles the Parthian struggle against Seleucus (Lerouge-Cohen 2007, 
274).
20 For Elymais under the Seleucids, note Dąbrowa 2004; 2014.
21 Cf. Lerner 1999, 37.
22 In fact, Justin compares Arsaces’ military success to Cyrus the Great and Alexander the Great, each 
of whom capitalized on hegemonic war during a power-transition crisis (Justin, XLI, 5.1–6. Note 
Overtoom 2016a, 985–987. For the reception of Alexander in Iranian and Roman traditions, see 
Overtoom 2011; 2012; 2013; Nabel 2017; Moore ed. 2017).
23 Cf. Schippmann 1980, 22; Wolski 1996, 182. Contra Engels 2011; 2014a; 2014b; Strootman 2015; 
Wenghofer 2018.
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ger 1989, no. 234; Overtoom forthcoming c). After settling affairs in Babylonia and Media, he 
attempted to reoccupy Parthia before suffering his defeat. This expedition seemingly spanned 
several years, lasting long enough for Seleucus to grow his iconic large beard. Whether or not 
Seleucus was a captive of the Parthians for a portion of his time in the east, it does not appear 
he returned to Babylonia until 229/228 (Sachs – Hunger 1989, no. 229).
Seleucus II’s long absence and eventual defeat in the east encouraged his brother, Antiochus 
Hierax, to renew the civil war in the west and to invade Syria and Mesopotamia. Antiochus’ 
aggression in the west created a desperate situation for Seleucus. If Seleucus remained at 
odds with the Parthians and Bactrians (or, more desperately, if he remained a prisoner), he 
risked losing the western portion of the empire to his hostile brother. By 229/228 Seleucus 
needed to come to terms with Arsaces I and Diodotus II to avoid a two-front war, to deter 
further expansion by the Parthians and Bactrians against Seleucid lands, and to pursue the 
civil war against his brother in the west. After his defeat against the Parthians, Seleucus had 
little choice but to acquiesce to the demands of Arsaces and Diodotus, and if Seleucus had 
become a captive, he had even less leverage. To this point Jeffrey Lerner has argued, ‘There is 
also nothing to preclude the possibility that one of the conditions for Seleucus’ release was his 
formal recognition of the sovereignty of Arsaces I and that of Diodotus II’ (Lerner 1999, 36). 
If Seleucus had in fact become a Parthian prisoner, it is hard to imagine that Arsaces would 
have released Seleucus without such assurances. Yet Seleucus’ defeat in the east and the re-
newal of civil war in the west was enough on its own to force Seleucus’ hand in recognizing 
the sovereignty of Parthia and Bactria. By agreeing to peace with Arsaces, Seleucus was able 
to take the garrisons he had established throughout Parthia with him back to Babylonia. This 
allowed Seleucus to consolidate his remaining forces to pursue the war against his brother 
and freed the Parthians of the burden of attacking fortified garrisons, allowing Arsaces to 
reoccupy southern Parthia with ease (Ammianus, XXIII, 6.3; Photius, Bib. 58; Justin, XLI, 4.10).
Although Seleucus II and the Seleucids did not abandon the possibility of future eastern 
campaigns to subdue the Parthians and Bactrians, the focus of the empire was in the west, and 
the renewed civil war against Antiochus Hierax took precedence. Justin criticizes Seleucus 
and Antiochus for not putting aside their differences to face outside threats to the empire, 
stating, ‘Leaving their foreign enemies unmolested, [they] continued the [civil] war for the 
destruction of each other’ (Justin, XXVII, 3.6). Western conflicts consumed Seleucus’ attention 
for the remainder of his reign, and it fell to his son, Antiochus III, to avenge Seleucus’ failures 
in the east.
Even after forming an alliance with Bactria and defeating the Seleucids in battle, Arsaces I 
still understood the dangers of the international environment in the Hellenistic Middle East 
and the potential power and threat of his neighbors. Once Seleucus II returned to the west 
to fight his brother, Arsaces immediately set into motion policies to maximize his power 
and the security of his kingdom. He settled the Parthian government, levied more soldiers, 
built new fortresses, and secured his urban centers (Justin, XLI, 5.1–4). Justin praises Arsaces, 
recording, ‘Thus Arsaces, having at once acquired and established a kingdom, and having 
become no less memorable among the Parthians than Cyrus among the Persians, Alexander 
among the Macedonians, or Romulus among the Romans, died at a mature old age; and the 
Parthians paid this honor to his memory, that they called all their kings thenceforward by 
the name of Arsaces’ (Justin, XLI, 5.5–6).24 Thus, these actions by Arsaces were a continuation 
of his earlier policy, when he had expanded his territory in northern Iran and enlarged his 
army (Justin, XLI, 4.8).
24 Cf. Strabo, XV, 1. 36.
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Yet despite the recent victory against the Seleucids, Parthian power remained fragile for 
several generations and the survival of the Parthian state was threatened continually (Over-
toom 2019a; 2019b; 2019c; Overtoom 2020, chs. 3–6; Overtoom forthcoming a).25 The Seleu-
cids had been defeated, but their power remained unrivalled in the east. Moreover, Bactria, 
although recently an ally, was another rival in the east that could return to its former hostility. 
Meanwhile, the uncertainty and volatility of the Central Asian steppe meant that nomadic 
raids or invasions remained a constant threat. These threats made complacency dangerous, 
and therefore, Arsaces I spent the rest of his reign securing his new kingdom, emphasizing 
political stability, military growth, and frontier security. Ammianus records, ‘Finally, after all 
the neighboring lands had been brought under his [Arsaces’] rule, by force, by regard for jus-
tice, or by fear, and he had filled Persia with cities, with fortified camps, and with strongholds, 
and to all the neighboring peoples, which she [the Parthian state] had previously feared, he 
had made her a constant cause of dread, he died a peaceful death in middle life’ (Ammianus, 
XXIII, 6.3–4). Again, although Ammianus exaggerates Arsaces’ accomplishments, we see the 
importance of the perception of power in the ancient world and an emphasis on the creation 
of state stability and security. Photius in his summary of Arrian’s Parthica also records that 
Arsaces set up his government and established a powerful state (Photius, Bib. 58).26
Fear was an important aspect of ancient geopolitical interactions between states. The 
uncertainty of power relations and power capabilities in interstate politics meant that fear 
of neighboring states and the use of fear to project power was common in the ancient world.27 
One of Arsaces I’s principle policies after his defeat of Seleucus II’s eastern campaign was to 
establish a fearful reputation for the Parthians. In so doing he enhanced the perceived power 
of the Parthians in the region, deterring aggression from warlike neighbors and enhancing the 
security of Parthia. Arsaces’ militarized policies in part were a reaction to the harsh realities of 
the bellicose and volatile international environment in the Hellenistic Middle East in this period.
Arsaces I’s defeat of Seleucus II barred the Seleucids from reclaiming their eastern fron-
tier along the Central Asian steppe for another generation, and Parthia firmly emerged as 
a power on the Iranian plateau. The remainder of Arsaces’ reign was a period of stability and 
prosperity; however, this period of peace did not last. Although the rivalry of the Parthians 
and Seleucids began in the 230s, it would dominate the geopolitics of the Hellenistic Middle 
East for another century-and-a-half.
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